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If the current formation had to go to war today against peer and near-peer opponents, the brigade would not be set up for success. Leaders would quickly find that the infantry brigade is too slow, too dependent on external support, and unable to control large swaths of land compared to Stryker and armor brigade formations.
This is readily apparent when one looks at the differences between the National Training Center in California, where Stryker and armor brigades conduct pre-deployment training, and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana, where infantry brigades conduct theirs. Infantry brigades would quickly be forced into niche roles to enable armored formations to conduct the main operation.
This is not to say that current infantry brigades would not succeed, as success is dependent on more than just how a unit is structured, but the current setup does the brigade no favors.
This would cause the formations not to survive a major war as they currently stand, likely either being drastically changed during the conflict or replaced completely afterwards. Unfortunately, with zero growth as a constraint, there are no options where every military occupational specialty wins.
The brigade must lose a perceived capability in one place in order to improve elsewhere. The challenge is how to do so while improving the brigade as a whole. My recommended, and no doubt controversial, change is to remove of one of the three infantry battalions to open up positions for use elsewhere. This is not the first time cutting elements of a brigade to stand up additional units elsewhere has been brought up, either.
The positions freed up will allow the brigade to stand the special troops battalion back up, increase engineer and reconnaissance capabilities, and add additional firepower to the remaining infantry battalions. Prior to the brigade combat team redesign, the special troops battalion was home to military intelligence, signal, and one engineer company. When the redesign occurred, a second engineer company was added, and the battalion was reflagged as a brigade engineer battalion. Why remove an infantry battalion, one might ask?
The infantry battalions are the largest subordinate formations, and by removing one, the brigade maximizes the availability of new positions. The removal would make approximately positions available including the forward support company for repurposing. The special troops battalion would gain the signal and military intelligence companies currently in the engineer battalion and the forward support and headquarters companies from the defunct infantry battalion.
Additionally, the battalion would be assigned an electronic warfare company to fill a critical gap in capability. The last addition to the new battalion would be an air defense company with short-range air defense platoons and a man-portable stinger MANPADS platoon. The short-range platoons and man-portable missiles will create a layered air defense that will be able to protect the brigade from both enemy attack jets and attack helicopters. These layered air defense units will provide a critical resource against not only hostile drones but also opponents who have been improving their own ability to conduct close air support over the past decade.
Once the military intelligence and signal companies transfer to the special troops battalion, the engineer battalion will be able to focus entirely on engineer tasks and missions. With manpower positions freed up by the removal of an infantry battalion, the engineers can add one additional man sapper platoon, bringing the total in the battalion to four platoons.
The engineer battalion can additionally reorganize its horizontal platoons into one horizontal company. This new company would consist of three horizontal platoons and one route clearance platoon. Finally, the battalion headquarters would gain a single explosive ordnance disposal platoon to further aid route clearance and explosive disposal operations.
The battalion forward support company would also see a slight increase in size to account for additional vehicles added to the battalion. These programs run smoothly, produce equipment at known costs and on predictable schedules, and avoid acquisition scandals that in the past embarrassed the Army in front of Congress and the public.
Two relatively new programs are also in production: the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, an armored light truck and replacement for the up-armored HMMWVs, and the Armored Multipurpose Vehicle, a replacement for the M armored personnel carrier. For example, the Apache fleet averages 8 years and the Chinook fleet 10 years. This reflects preparation for the intense combat that conflict with a great power would entail. A long-standing concern about Army modernization is that there are few new systems coming online to replace the existing generation.
Chart 7 shows funding for the modernization priorities. Changes from FY to FY are modest, except for increases in air and missile defense and soldier lethality to cover procurement.
Shown below are major initiatives in development. The list gives a sense of systems that might enter the force in the future. This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report. This report is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS , a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues.
Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author s.
All rights reserved. Please consult the PDF for references. Skip to main content. Photo: Spc. Download the Report. Key Takeaways After a dip in personnel strength in FY , both regular and reserve components have recovered.
This represents a substantial reduction to earlier growth plans, but probably the most expansion that can be done in the current budget and security environment. New air and missile defense units are entering the force. Security Force Advisory Brigades continue despite their focus on stability operations. Other new kinds of units, such as the widely discussed multidomain brigades, remain mostly conceptual.
There is now less tension between regular Army and its reserve components as a result of closer consultations, higher overall budgets, and shared recruitment challenges. Army modernization, which forms the basis for future forces, is a mix of good and bad news: the good news is that the Army continues production of proven systems and has a well-modernized force as a result. In an environment of constrained resources, the Army will need to cut existing Brigade Combat Teams BCTs if it wants to build new units and procure new systems.
So far it has been unwilling to do this. Download the Full Report. Written By. Media Queries. Contact H. Most Recent From Mark F. Cancian Upcoming Event. November 16, In the News. Janes Pat Host. November 9, As defense disruptions loom, Biden eases up on vaccine refusers.
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